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Abstrak
Pembentukan ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) merepresentasikan 
bentuk lain dari Preferential Trading Agreement (PTA). Melalui logika 
Neorealisme, para peneliti menjelaskan hal tersebut sebagai upaya 
negara-negara ASEAN untuk menanggapi kekuatan Uni Eropa, North 
America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) dan pertumbuhan pesat 
negara China. Tulisan ini secara kritis melihat kembali logika Neorealisme 
untuk menjelaskan mengapa negara-negara ASEAN bergabung 
dalam AFTA dan mengapa mereka bersetuju untuk mengadopsi 
kerangka kerjasama perdagangan bebas, yang bersifat selektif dan 
gradual. Pembentukan AFTA tidak secara konsisten merefleksikan 
kerjasama tersebut dan Neorealisme tidak bisa menjelaskan kerangka 
kerjasama tersebut. Alih-alih menempatkan kekuatan (power) sebagai 
satu-satunya variabel independen yang relevan dan penjelasan atas 
sebab-akibat terbentuknya states-regime, gabungan kepentingan dan 
kekuatan (power) menyediakan satu set variabel yang bisa menjelaskan 
kerjasama antarnegara dan kerangkanya. Dari situ, kerjasama negara-
negara ASEAN dalam bidang ekonomi dan perdagangan tidak hanya 
menjelaskan mengapa negara-negara tersebut membentuk AFTA 
pada tahun 1992, namun tulisan ini akan mengklarifikasi mengapa 
mereka bersetuju untuk mengadopsi liberalisasi perdagangan yang 
bersifat selektif dan gradual.
Kata kunci: Neorealisme, kerjasama negara, kerangka kerjasama, AFTA, liberalisasi 
selektif dan gradual, state-regime.
Introduction
Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA) have become an ubiquitous 
phenomenon in the last two decades; states are increasingly cooperating in 
liberalizing trade. Widening and deepening relatively inefficiacious their 
previous PTA agreements, ASEAN states established an ASEAN Free Trade 
Area (AFTA) in 1992. 
Similar to other PTAs (Ravenhill 1995, 2003, 2008), ASEAN states 
selectively excluded some trade items and put them in Temporary Exclusion 
List (TEL), General Exception List (GEL), and Sensitive List (SL). ASEAN 
states also adopted a gradual trade liberalization approach. They agreed to 
reduce and eliminate import tariffs, quantitative restrictions, and other non-
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tariff barriers within a period of 15 years beginning January 1, 1993.
Many scholars explain ASEAN states as a reaction to external dynamics. 
The formation of AFTA was intended to maintain and improve their strategic 
position after the establishment of the European Union (EU), the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC); the rise of China; and the collapse of USSR (Ariff 1994: 226-
229; Ravenhill 1995: 853). Lower trade barriers increased intra-ASEAN trade, 
fostered the ASEAN region as a production base, and attracted investment to 
the participating states (Ravenhill 1995: 854; Bowles and MacLean 1996: 332-
340; Athukorala and Menon 1996: 87-90; Buszynski 1997/98: 566-568; Chia 
1998: 218; Ethier 1998: 1150, 1156-1159). 
This paper critically discusses the Neorealist explanation of ASEAN 
states’ cooperation in AFTA, and their agreement to gradual and selective 
liberal trade cooperation-design. The AFTA case represents the problems of 
state cooperation and cooperation design which color PTA around the world. 
In the begining, this paper describes Neorealism’s theoretical explanation 
of state cooperation and cooperation design. It then empirically argues that 
Neorealism does not provide an adequate explanation of ASEAN states’ 
cooperation, their gradual and selective trade liberalization. This paper then 
proposes state-regimes as another independent variable that can explain 
ASEAN states’ cooperation in AFTA.
Neorealism and State Cooperation: A Balancing and Bandwagoning 
Cooperation
Inheriting the Realist tradition, Neorealism considers interactions between 
states as a reflection of the relative power distribution between them. A 
stronger state dominates smaller states, and smaller states tend to bandwagon 
with the stronger state. States who have relatively equal power balance and 
deter each other. Conflicts are inherent in the Neorealist world, while peace 
and cooperation are merely considered temporary.
In Neorealism the international state system is anarchic. This does not 
mean that the system is chaotic, but only that it lacks a centralized authority 
that is capable of governing states’ behavior and interactions. A strong power, 
even if a hegemonic power, cannot function as a centralized authority because 
the logic of anarchy conditions other states to balance against it. International 
organizations also cannot play this role because their authority is limited and 
subject to states’ agreement. States are still the key actors in international 
politics. Anarchy does not subject states to perpetual war, it merely curses 
them with “relentless security competition” with inherent possibility of war 
(Mearsheimer 1994/95: 9).
The logic of anarchy leaves states as scattered self-interested actors and 
to be able only to expect help from themselves. Uncertainty over the true 
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intentions of others conditions, states prepare for the worst case scenario. 
States are persistently fearful of engulfment and troubled by threats, both 
real and imagined. Without a centralized authority who can ensure peaceful 
relations, each state has to rely on its own capabilities to protect itself. There 
is no guarantee of help from others because other states potentially stand to 
profit from others weakness. Today’s friends can be tomorrow’s enemies. In 
anarchy, “there is no overarching authority to prevent others from using violence, or 
the threat of violence, to destroy or enslave them” (Grieco 1988: 497-498, emphasis 
is original). “Self-help is necessarily the principle of action in an anarchic 
order” (Waltz 1979: 111). Those who are incapable of helping themselves live 
in constant danger; states become self-interested. They are always concerned 
with their own survival first and consider other states only in relation to the 
fulfillment of their own interests. An anarchic system and uncertainty over 
others’ true intentions keeps states from thinking of helping each other and 
hinder cooperation between states (Waltz 1979: 105-118).
Anarchy makes survival becomes the “the highest end” for states (Waltz 
1979: 126). Without survival, all other goals will be meaningless. For that 
reason security concerns subordinates other goals (Waltz 1979: 93, 107, 126), 
including the four basic state interests: political power, aggregate national 
income, economic growth, and social stability (Krasner 1976: 317-9). States 
basically accumulate and use capabilities—size of population and territory, 
resource endowment, military capability, economic strength, political stability 
and competence (Waltz 1979: 131)—to assure their survival. 
Building up military capabilities to the degree which deters foreign 
threats and attacks, consequently becomes the best choice for states to survive 
autonomously. Power or “force serve[s], not only as the ultima ratio, but 
indeed as the first and constant one” (Waltz 1959: 232). Relative power and 
power distribution are critical in a threatening world. Relative capabilities 
determine states’ position in the international power structure. To ensure 
their security, states are forced to cautiously and constantly observe other’s 
capabilities (Waltz 1979: 131). Becoming a greater power relative to others 
does not only reduce potential threats and assure security, but also opens the 
opportunity to dominate or weaker states. In contrast, having weaker powers 
means having lower positions and a more dangerous life. The relative power 
in the international power structure determines the probability that states  will 
fear engulfment and destruction. Only in a stable balance of power situation, 
when the world becomes much less threatening, will concern over relative 
power relax and absolute power become more significant (Waltz 1979: 195). 
Since power solely affects what states can and cannot do, it is the strongest 
powers that shape the world order and direct the weaker states’ behaviors.
Nevertheless, the importance of power does not make it an end unto 
to itself. Unlike Realism which considers power as “the immediate aim” 
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and interest (Morgenthau 1954: 5, 25), for Neorealists in general, power is “a 
means” to ensure survival and “not an end” (Waltz 1979: 126). In a balance of 
power structure, power maximization, rather than creating a safer situation, 
creates more dangers. Increased power is perceived  to be an intensified threat, 
which subsequently stimulates other states to strengthen themselves (Waltz 
1979: 126-7). States rationally restrain themselves from power maximization to 
deal with the balance of power dilemma. For Neorealism (except for offensive 
realism), balancing capabilities, not the maximization of power, is necessary 
for survival.
Figure 1. Neorealism and State Interactions
Two kinds of cooperative alignment may occur in power-based 
interactions. The first is a balancing coalition to deter external threats; the 
second is bandwagoning, a hegemonic coalition between a hegemon and 
weaker states.
The reluctance of lose autonomy under a hegemon encourages states 
to balance, rather than to bandwagon, a stronger state. If possible, weaker 
states choose not to bandwagon with the stronger state “for it is the stronger 
side that threatens them” (Waltz 1979: 127). States may cooperate to mobilize 
their own combined capabilities to deter threats and meet their self-interests 
(Walt 2005: 114). However, as uncertainty of other states’ true intention never 
evaporates, states prefer to rely on their own capabilities and undertake 
internal balancing rather than externally balance or form balancing alliances 
(Waltz 1979: 168). 
Nevertheless, states may not sufficient internal capabilities to balance 
others with internal adjustments. A lack of individual balancing capabilities 
forces weaker states to make balancing coalitions against threatening 
stronger states or coalitions. A common interest in deterring prevailing 
threats encourages weaker states to ally. A balancing coalition provides a 
safer environment for weaker states firstly because the weaker states can pool 
enough defensive capabilities to deter potential threats from a stronger state 
(Waltz 1979: 127), and secondly, because the coalition members are relatively 
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weak and do not have the offensive capabilities to betray other members. 
Aligning with weaker allies even enables a state to relatively maintain its 
autonomy and play some roles in the coalition. Risk of being attacked by a 
threatening stronger state reduces the temptation of the coalition members 
to defect. Concern over relative gains distribution necessitates states to 
constantly prevent each other from free riding. 
Power imbalance, in other circumstances, allows a hegemonic power 
to create a hegemonic or bandwagoning coalition in order “to promote its 
own interests” (Gilpin 2001: 99; see also Mearsheimer 1995: 83-4). Without 
enough internal power or allies to build a balancing coalition, persistent 
balancing behaviors will invite coercive measures from the hegemon. Weaker 
states have no other choice except to bandwagon with the greater state and 
hope for benevolence. In this case, the costs of opposing or balancing exceed 
the benefits. Despite the fewer relative gains they get from a bandwagoning 
coalition due to the greater state’s concern over relative gains, bandwagoning 
allows a weaker state to survive. The probability of trickle down benefits from 
hegemony also helps to make bandwagoning a rational option (Waltz 1979: 
126). 
In a bandwagoning coalition, risks of being punished or engulfed by the 
hegemon discourage weaker states from defecting or free riding. A greater 
state can prevent defection by maintaining power imbalance, maintaining 
potential threats to the bandwagoning states, and taking relatively greater 
gains from the alignment. The weaker states are continuously forced to 
bandwagon and appease the stronger state, despite the potential danger of 
the hegemon’s aggresive actions.
A hegemon, the Hegemonic Stability Theory (HTS) argues, can shape the 
bandwagoning states’ interests and nurture their commitments by constructing 
an international regime. Here, an international regime functions merely as 
an instrument that the hegemon uses to legitimate its hegemony, and thus 
reduces the probability of defection and free riding. This international regime 
nevertheless does not replace the critical function of power in enforcing 
compliance and creating governance. Even though hegemonic power is “a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition” for cooperation and compliance, the 
continuation of a hegemonic coalition that the regime legitimates still depends 
on powers (Gilpin 2001: 94, 97, emphasis is original). 
Both balancing and bandwagoning cooperation above derive from 
negative interests. As self-help actors, states do not have a given interest 
in cooperation. States collaborate not because they have positive common 
interests and seeing potential benefits of cooperation, as Neoliberals argue, 
but because of their negative common interests: fear of being engulfed by 
stronger states and avoiding harmful consequences from external threats. 
While a balancing coalition continues as long as there is a threatening greater 
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power (Waltz 1979: 166), a bandwagoning coalition endures as long as a 
power imbalance persists. In other words, cooperation is merely a temporary 
instrument in states pursuit of self-interest, survival and security.
In a balancing coalition, despite some compromises, differences in alliance 
strategies caused by divergent positive interests cause states to compete 
over leadership of the alliance. Being the  stronger ally is a prerequisite to 
claiming leadership; by influencing the weaker partners the stronger state can 
create their relative dependence (Waltz 1979: 126, 166). States are also aware 
that today’s friends can be tomorrow’s enemies. This precludes them from 
overcoming their concern over relative gains and involve states in a game 
of battle of the sexes (Table 1). In this game, states are aware of the benefits 
of cooperation but fight over the relative gains (Mearsheimer 1994/95: 12-3). 
Because “the fundamental goal of states in any relationship is to prevent others from 
achieving advances in their relative capabilities” (Grieco 1988: 498, emphasis is 
original), “in a condition of anarchy, …relative gain is more important than 
absolute gain” (Waltz 1959: 198). Hence, there is not a structural reason for 
states to nurture common positive interests and be unconditionally loyal and 
trustable partners. Internal frictions continuously color the alignment. Even 
in balancing cooperation, states are still potential enemies and self-interested 
actors who have to rely on their own powers to survive.
Table 1. Distribution of Gains from International Cooperation,
in a 2x2 Matrix of Battle of the Sexes Game
Notes:
This scenario envisages two states that plan to make economic cooperation. 
Being constrained with different and limited resources, state A prefers an 
industrial cooperation and state B wants trade cooperation. Two stable 
equilibrium and Pareto optimum outcomes ()* emerge in this scenario.
The numbers represent ordinarily ranked benefits: 1 is worst, 4 is best. 
The numbers in each cell represent state A’s gain and state B’s gain, 
respectively. A bracket denotes equilibrium, and an asterisk denotes the 
Pareto optimum outcome.
Gilpin (2001: 79-80), nevertheless, takes a bit different position regarding 
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completely discard relative-gains consideration, when dealing with political 
economic issues, states often “ignore this concern” for security reasons. After 
the World War II, the capitalist United States (US) economically helped 
Western Europe and Japan in order to balance the communist Soviet Union. 
As a liberal hegemon, the US “must satisfy the interests of all the major 
economic powers to at least some degree” to make the coalition functioned. 
The partners even gained economic benefits “more than” the US (Gilpin 2001: 
88). This explanation is inconsistent with the Neorealism’s basic argument 
of power competition. If states are really individually egoist actors, allowing 
more relative gains to accrue to hegemonized states for a long period time 
will enable the states to escape the hegemon’s influence. Since economic 
gains can be transformed into military power (Waltz 1979: 187), sacrificing 
economic relative-gains for security-loyalty endangers the sustainability of 
hegemonic relations. Frankly speaking, what does power hegemony means if 
the hegemon benefits less than the hegemonized states.
In a bandwagoning or hegemonic coalition, “it is the stronger side that 
threatens” the weaker states (Waltz 1979: 127) and because the hegemon creates 
a coalition for “its own interests” (Gilpin 2001: 99), there is no motivation for 
the weaker states to be loyal to the hegemon. Concern over limited autonomy 
and perpetual hegemony cause the weaker states to retain the temptation to 
defect and free-ride. Internal friction is inherent in a bandwagoning alignment 
because, in anarchy, states are destined to be potential enemies without given 
positive interests in cooperation. 
Neorealism thus predicts limited cooperation between states; cooperation 
merely reflects power distribution and state’s own interests. States want to 
maximize their gains relative to their partners. Cooperation among states is 
fragile because it occurs in a world that is inherently competitive (Mearsheimer 
1994/95: 12-13). Uncertainty over other states’ intentions, concerns over 
relative-gains, possibilities of free-riding, defection and betrayal, and 
leadership competition work “against their cooperation” (Waltz 1979: 105). 
Cooperation in a Neorealist world cannot overcome insecurity and the fear 
of engulfment. Neorealist states prefer to act selfishly despite the potential 
negative consequence on cooperation. Consequently, cooperation tends to be 
short-lived rather than long-lived. Power distribution and power struggle, 
Neorealists claim, determine interactions between states. 
Neorealism and Cooperation Design
Pessimism over cooperation leads Neorealism to be less concerned with 
cooperation design. The HST only focuses on liberal international cooperation 
and does not concern itself with non-liberal cooperation built by the Soviet 
Union, Nazi Germany or militarized Japan. Since power is the sole independent 
variable, Neorealism claims that it is power alone that determines cooperation 
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design in an alliance. Even though free market regimes contribute to the 
construction of liberal state cooperation, it is the hegemonic state that enforces 
the liberal governance and ensures the weaker states’ compliance (Gilpin 
2001: 94).
Power indeed is crucial in determining cooperation design. However, 
as the HST admits that “a hegemon is a necessary but not a sufficient condition” 
for the formation and maintenance of a liberal international economy, power 
does not manifest as the only independent factor that determine cooperation 
design. Despite its hegemonic power, the Soviet Union built a communist 
international alliance. Another independent factor thus affects cooperation 
design.
Neorealism argues that stronger states’ interests can be another factor 
that explain cooperation design. Based on “basic state interests” (Krasner 
1976: 317) states instrumentally calculate, act and interact. These interests 
include survival (Waltz 1979: 126), political power, aggregate national income, 
economic growth, and social stability (Krasner 1976: 317-318). To support its 
interests in a market economy, the United States built liberal alliances; whereas 
the Soviet Union constructed communist cooperation to promote its command 
economy. In this way, while power determines who designs the cooperation, 
interests explain to what what even cooperation design is applied.
Nevertheless, such basic state interests are “nonoperational” (George 
& Keohane 1980: 226). To increase aggregate national income, for example, 
states may utilize liberal or  protectionist policies. As Krasner (1976: 339-340) 
shows, despite becoming the strongest state in the world, the US adopted a 
protectionist policy during the period of 1918-1939 and applied a liberal policy 
during 1945-1960. During the Cold War, the US and the Soviet Union applied 
different political economic regimes: while the US promoted the market 
economy and the Soviet Union fostered communist command economy. The 
greater state may even sacrifice relative gains in order to design cooperation 
to support other goals. Neorealism and HST cannot answer the question of 
why liberal cooperation continued, and even deepened, despite the collapse 
of communist regime and the decline of US economic hegemony. In other 
words, the conception of basic state interests cannot explain what kind of 
cooperation design the greater state may support.
This underspecification problem of basic state interests creates 
methodological problems as well. Considering interests as given and 
objective, Neorealism does not explain “how and why their descriptions” 
of state interests correspond to objective reality (Rosenau 1968: 35). There 
is no clear instrumental reason why during the period of 1945-1960, the US 
preferred promoting liberal economic policies and did not continue its pre-
war protectionist policies to increase aggregate income. Inferring specific 
state interests from actions and interactions means imposing an “evaluative 
Ganjar Nugroho208
framework of the describer” (Rosenau 1968: 37-39) and committing in a 
post hoc ergo propter hoc logical fallacy. In other words, it is Neorealists’ own 
“values” that “serve as the basis for ranking some values as preferable to 
others” (Rosenau 1968: 37) and explain why the greater state prefers certain 
cooperation designs to others.
Leaving the definition of subgoals or “the policies of state” (Krasner 
1976: 343) to state leaders does not also solve Neorealist problems in 
explaining cooperation design. First, such solution deviates from Neorealist 
structural explanation (Waltz 1979: 79) and undermines Realists’ unit-based 
arguments. Second, rather than reflecting objective reality, the policies 
represent the leaders’ subjective interpretation of reality (Rosenau 1968: 34; 
George & Keohane 1980: 219). This departs from Neorealism assumption of 
the objectivity power structure. Third, value-laden criteria are necessary to 
assess the legitimacy of policies the state leaders make (Kratochwil 1982: 13). 
In summary, Neorealism does not adequately explain why and what make 
states agree to have a certain cooperation design.
ASEAN States’ Cooperation in AFTA: a Balancing Cooperation?
For Neorealism, the establishment of ASEAN in 1967 was considered a 
response to the external threats of Communist in Vietnam. Five ASEAN 
states (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand) agreed 
to align despite their previous animosity. ASEAN states’ agreements on the 
Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in 1971 and the Treaty 
of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 1976 were reactionary responses to the 
Vietnam War and the US defeat, respectively (Frost 1990: 4-8). In Neorealism’s 
logic, ASEAN security alignment and its deepening would not have taken 
place without such an external threat.
Similarly, Neorealists consider ASEAN states’ cooperation in AFTA a 
response to external threats and a reflection of power competition (see Hurrell 
1995: 49). In 1986 European states enacted a Single European Act (SEA) and 
agreed to establish a single market by 1992. They further agreed in the Treaty 
of Maastricht of 1993 to form the European Union. Subsequently, the US, 
Canada and Mexico also regionally integrated trade by implementing the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. These integrations 
increased trade among members and diverted trade from non-members. Both 
the EU and NAFTA countries grew their economies, their share of global 
trade, and therefore their relative power.
In Neorealism’s logic, the EU and NAFTA PTAs posed two threats to 
ASEAN states. The first threat is trade diversion that benefited member states 
and reduced ASEAN states’ exports to Europe and the US. In 1990, ASEAN5’s1 
exports  to EU states and the US reached $22.9 bi l l ion (or 16.4% 
1 ASEAN5 represents Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.
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of ASEAN5’s total exports) and $27.9 billion (20.1%), respectively. Those 
amounts were higher than ASEAN5 intra-regional trade, which amounted 
to $25.2 billion (18.1%) in the same year (IMF Directions of Trades [DOTs] 
1990, author’s calculation). With relatively high trade dependence on the 
EU and the US, trade diversion threatened ASEAN states’ economies. This, 
together with the potential deadlock of the Uruguay Round in 1991, there was 
anxiety over whether the EU and NAFTA would become regional trade blocs 
discriminating against non-members (Nesadurai 2003: 9).
The second threat would manifest itself as a smaller share of relative 
power distribution. The growing trade shares and welfare improvements 
that the integration brought, would increase the EU and NAFTA member 
states’ economic power relative to the rest of the world. With their advanced 
development, they indeed already had relatively strong economic power. The 
establishment of EU and NAFTA consequently further deteriorated ASEAN 
states’ economic position in global arena. 
The formation of APEC in 1989 and the end of the Cold War in 1991 are 
seen as two events that undermined ASEAN states’ strategic position. During 
the Cold War, ASEAN states were positioned as strategic allies to encircle 
and contain Communist in China and Vietnam, and limit the influence 
of the Soviet Union on a global level. Such position gave ASEAN states a 
better strategic position in the form of market access, foreign investment and 
foreign aids from capitalist US and Japan. The establishment of APEC shifted 
major economies’ attention from ASEAN states to other Asia-Pacific states 
(Bowles & MacLean 1996: 340; Buszynski 1997/98: 566-568). The collapse of 
the communist alliance also ended major security threats and evaporated the 
rationale of ASEAN as a security alliance (Ariff 1994: 226-229; Ravenhill 1995: 
853). 
Besides those global developments, the establishment of AFTA is also 
interpreted as a response to the emerging regional dynamics. While Japan‘s 
advanced economy compelled ASEAN states to bandwagon with it, China’s 
growing and increasingly competitive economy still allowed them to balance 
against Japan. China’s rise diverted foreign investment away from ASEAN 
states. While in 1990 China shared 1.7% of world FDI inflows or about one 
fourth of ASEAN states’ shares, in 2000 China’s share reached 2.9% while 
ASEAN states’ share decreased significantly to 1.7% (UNCTAD 2007, author’s 
calculation; see also Chia 2006: 126-129). China also competed with ASEAN 
states’ exports to develop states. Its cheap and relatively good products even 
threatened ASEAN states’ producers by invading their domestic markets 
(Voon and Yue 2003: 164-165; Chia 2006: 110-126; Chia and Sussangkarn 
2006: 109-114). While in 1990 China’s share in ASEAN5’s imports was 13.0%, it 
grew to 23.0% in 2000 and 47.7% in 2005 (IMF DOTs 1990, 2000, 2005, author’s 
calculation). Moreover, with its latent economic potential China’s relative 
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economic powers will continue to grow and weaken ASEAN states’ relative 
position. For Neorealism, China’s rise threatens ASEAN states.
The establishment of AFTA is then interpreted by Neorealists as a 
balancing response to the above dynamics. The establishment of AFTA would 
redefine the rationale of ASEAN from a security alliance to an economic alliance. 
AFTA would lower trade barriers, create and divert trade, and enlarge the 
intra-ASEAN market. This was to help construct ASEAN production network 
and attract foreign investment. Through AFTA, ASEAN states attempted to 
offset the trade diversion effects that the EU and the NAFTA brought, and the 
investment and trade diversions caused by China’s rise (Ravenhill 1995: 854; 
Bowles & MacLean 1996: 336; Chia 1998: 218). AFTA was to maintain ASEAN 
states’ bargaining position at global and regional levels.
The Malaysian Prime Minister’s proposal to form an East Asian Economic 
Group (EAEG) in 1990 at first seems to support the balancing argument. 
Mahathir (1993) envisioned a region of “sustained cooperative peace and 
prosperity stretching from Jakarta to Tokyo”. Even though he said that the 
EAEG was not intended to be a trading block or any kind of PTA, only “a 
loose consultative forum,” Mahathir (1992) intended the EAEG to “provide a 
strong voice for the East Asian countries trade negotiation with the rest of the 
world, particularly the EC [European Community] and NAFTA [so that] East 
Asia will be one of the three main regional groups and will exert its influence 
on world trade.”
Nevertheless, there are several problems with the balancing thesis. 
ASEAN5 states’ relative power was far below the US and the EU. In 1990, 
the US and the EU’s GDP were 20 and 25 times higher than ASEAN5’s GDP, 
respectively (World Bank’s World dataBank, author’s calculation). In the same 
year, ASEAN5’s total shares of the world imports were just 4.5%, whereas those 
of the EU and the US were 44.8% and 14.7%, respectively. Even though the 
creation of AFTA might increase ASEAN trade, ASEAN5’s share of the world 
imports in 2000 only reached 5.3% and did not balance the EU and the US’s 
shares which covered 37.5% and 18.8% of total world imports, respectively. 
ASEAN states’ imports were too small to affect international prices and have 
a global strategic effect (see also De Simone 1996: 113-4). China also reduced 
its gap with ASEAN states by increasing its share of world imports from 1.5% 
in 1990 to 3.4% in 2000 (IMF DOTs 1990, 2000, author’s calculation). ASEAN 
states are still relatively weak powers. Even aligning their economic and trade 
policies has not been enough to significantly balance the EU and the US. 
ASEAN states are in fact relatively dependant on the US and EU 
markets. As mentioned before, in 1990 the EU and the US shared 16.4% and 
20.1% of ASEAN5’s total exports respectively. ASEAN5’s shares in the EU 
and the US’s total exports, however, were small, amounting to only 1.4% 
and 4.8%, respectively. Although the numbers declined in 2000, the EU still 
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shared 14.8% and the US 19.4% of ASEAN5’s total exports (IMF DOTs 1990, 
2000, author’s calculation). Consequently, ASEAN states were in imbalanced 
position against the EU and the US. Balancing in case is risky and it invites 
retaliation—in the forms of trade protection or deepening regional trade 
integration—which may jeopardize dependent ASEAN states. Rather than 
balancing, bandwagoning is more instrumentally rational. 
Although Mahathir’s proposal to form an EAEG in 1990, can be interpreted 
as a response to the EU and NAFTA, it does not support the idea that ASEAN 
states’ were balancing against China. Instead, Malaysia intended to engage 
China by incorporating it as a group member. Moreover, ASEAN states 
even accepted China’s proposal to establish a PTA in 2000 and concluded a 
framework agreement of PTA in 2002. This engagement indeed may prevent 
China’s adventurous and assertive moves. This trend obviously contradicts 
the idea of AFTA as an attempt by ASEAN states’ to balance China.
ASEAN states are not internally cohesive and do not have a single voice 
due to their different levels of developments and trade regimes. Singapore, 
for example, had become relatively developed with $14,658 per capita income 
by 1990, while other ASEAN states had per capita incomes below $3,000 
(World Bank, World dataBank). Singapore was disposed to adopt a free trade 
regime, while other ASEAN states only started to liberalize their economies 
in 1980s. After 2000, Singapore has also been very active in forming PTAs 
with non-ASEAN states, contrasting it with Indonesia and the Philippines 
relative passivity. Malaysia, which then ironically followed Singapore’s steps 
in pursuing PTAs, believed that bilateral PTAs with non-ASEAN states would 
weaken ASEAN cohesion (Ravenhill 2003: 304). Such disparate strategies and 
uncoordinated policies undermine Neorealists’ interpretation of the formation 
of AFTA as balancing move against the EU, the US and China. 
The deepening of AFTA also creates problems for Neorealists’ explanation. 
Neorealism argues that cooperation takes place as a manifestation of negative 
interests. The formation of AFTA is interpreted as a response to external threats 
from the potentially protective EU and NAFTA, the potentially binding APEC, 
the potential failure of Uruguay Round, and China’s rise. China’s economic 
growth still poses an external threat nowadays but the EU and NAFTA did 
not become protective fortresses, the Uruguay Round was concluded in the 
establishment of the WTO, and APEC worked on the base of voluntarism, 
used non-binding liberalization, and even lost much of its influence after the 
1998 financial crisis (Nesadurai 2003: 10). If external threat is the rationale for 
states to undertake cooperation, there was no reason for ASEAN states to 
sustain and deepen AFTA after some of the potential external threats were 
failed to actualize.
AFTA did not even manage the clear cut distribution of gains needed to 
support Neorealists’ argument of relative gains. Park’s (1995: 118-122) CGE-
macrosimulation describes (Table I.5), the benefits and costs of AFTA are 
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distributed unequally among ASEAN states. Indonesia, which had the highest 
GDP, and Singapore, which had the highest level of economic development, 
gained smaller percentage of welfare improvements. Including other factors—
overall price, budget deficit, and trade deficit—makes the general distributive 
effects of AFTA become more confusing. Besides the benefits, Malaysia 
suffered a strong negative effect on budget deficit; Indonesia lost in its overall 
price and trade balance; and Thailand experienced a negative effect on trade 
and budget deficits. These indefinite distributive gains and losses undermine 
Neorealists’ argument of relative gains. It is not clear “[w]ho will gain more” 
(Waltz 1979: 105) from the formation of AFTA. Consequently, it is also not 
really clear in the Neorealist view of the international system why ASEAN 
states agreed to cooperate in AFTA.
Table 2.  CGE-Macrosimulation Results of the Effects of AFTA Reduction Policies
   Notes:     CGE-Macrosimulation of a mutual 50%-reduction of tariff rate.
   Source:    Adapted from Park (1995: 118-122).
Therefore, the formation of AFTA cannot be fully interpreted as a 
balancing move. The balancing thesis does not clarify the target of ASEAN 
states balancing, how ASEAN states dealt with the distributive costs and 
benefits, and why they chose to balance and not to bandwagon.
ASEAN States’ Cooperation in AFTA:  Bandwagoning Cooperation?
If the formation of AFTA does not reflect balancing driven cooperation, for 
Neorealists, a bandwagoning cooperation is the only remaining explanation. 
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While ASEAN5 states shared 4.9% of global trade in 1992, the EU states 
and NAFTA states shared 43.1% and 18.1% of global trade, respectively 
(IMF DOTS 1992, author’s calculation). The imbalanced trade shares put 
pressure on weaker states. The formation of AFTA conforms to the liberal 
assumption that great economic powers imitate the pattern of regional trade 
integration that the EU and the US set up. As EU states deepened their 
economic integration and many states pushed PTAs, ASEAN states followed 
them by accelerating, widening and deepening AFTA. The AFTA rules also 
conformed to the General Agreement for Tariffs and Trade (GATT). AFTA 
covers “substantially all the trade” by including more than 92% products into 
Inclusion List; did not set “higher or more restrictive” tariffs than the MFN 
to non-ASEAN states; and scheduled tariff reduction “within a reasonable 
length of time” (GATT 1947, Art.XXIV, pr.5 & 8). ASEAN states’ regional 
liberalization projects are categorized as a WTO-plus liberalization, which 
covers other economic sectors. ASEAN states signed an ASEAN Framework 
Agreement on Services in 1995, launched an ASEAN Industrial Cooperation 
scheme in April 1996, and concluded a Framework Agreement on the ASEAN 
Investment Area  in 1998.
Neorealism could argue that AFTA conforms to HST’s regime argument; 
hegemonic powers construct a liberal regime to shape weaker states’ interests 
and guarantee their commitment. The US and the EU promote liberal 
regimes through regional trade integration and the establishment of the 
WTO. In this way, the formation of AFTA seems to represent ASEAN states’ 
bandwagoning—even though there was no longer a communist alliance to 
be balanced against. They adopted, reproduced and strengthened the liberal 
regime which hegemonic powers promoted. 
Nevertheless, this bandwagoning argument is not without problems. 
ASEAN states’ decision to build AFTA reflects competitive regionalism rather 
than emulative regionalism (Solís and Katada 2009: 12-22). Even though 
ASEAN states embraced a liberal trade regime, they did not formally join 
into the existing coalitions. As the US and the EU established their own liberal 
coalitions at regional level, ASEAN states followed by setting up a competitive 
liberal group vis-à-vis them. This competitive move weakens the supposed 
bandwagoning coalition. It also implies unrealistically that ASEAN states, 
despite their weaker power and trade dependence, have bargaining positions 
against the US and EU. 
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Table 3.  ASEAN5 States’ Shares in ASEAN5 (%) and Their GDP Per capita (US$), 1992
Sources: For population, area, GDP, FDI dan military data, see the World Bank’s World 
dataBank; for trade data, see IMF Directions of Trades.
ASEAN itself cannot be considered as a hegemonic coalition. Contrary 
to the HST which argues about the necessity of hegemonic power in 
international cooperation (Mattli 1999: 42-43; Gilpin 2001: 94), there was not a 
hegemon among ASEAN states. Despite Indonesia’s leading position in terms 
of population, surface area, and GDP, Indonesia lagged behind some other 
ASEAN states in terms of trades, FDI inflows, and level of development. In 
1992, Indonesia’s GDP per capita was the smallest (US$760) compared with 
other ASEAN5 states, and 20 times smaller than Singapore’s (US$15,388). Even 
though Singapore conducted significant trade with Malaysia and Indonesia, it 
left Indonesia’s global and intra-regional trade far behind. Thailand’s military 
power was also relatively equal to Indonesia’s. ASEAN states’ unequal level 
of development and relatively equal size also made trade openness among the 
states likely to be low to moderate (Krasner 1976: 323). Contrary to Neorealists 
arguments, even without a hegemon, ASEAN states’ regional cooperation in 
AFTA continued and was even strengthened gradually.
ASEAN States’ Gradual and Selective Liberal Trade Cooperation: a 
Rational Move?
ASEAN states agreed to have gradual and selective liberal trade cooperation 
in AFTA. AFTA included 92% items intra-regionally traded between ASEAN 
states excluding only sensitive and unprocessed agricultural products. The 
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CEPT Product Lists categorized a total of 44,991 tariff lines of six ASEAN 
states into Inclusion List (IL), Temporary Exclusion List (TEL), and General 
Exception List (GEL). The IL and TEL coverd 91.4% and 7.38%, respectively. 
While the tariff rates of products in IL were reduced to 0%-5% within the 
reduction period, products in TEL only enjoyed the concession until being 
included into IL. At the time of agreement, Indonesia temporarily excluded 
the most with 1,654 tariff lines and the least Singapore with no products in 
TEL. The TEL was reviewed in 2000 and it included in the final Exclusion List. 
Based on the protocol of TEL agreed to in 2000, states were allowed to deal 
with their domestic problems by temporarily delaying the transfer of TEL 
products into IL or suspending the concession they give to the transferred 
products (ASEAN Secretariat, 2000). The GEL covered 1.22% of the total tariff 
lines in 1993 and permanently excluded products for various reasons such as 
national security, human protection, health, and so forth. An AEM meeting in 
1995 made an amendment and set a new Sensitive List (SL). This list comprised 
287 tariff lines of sensitive unprocessed agricultural goods, which were under 
special liberalization measure (ASEAN Secretariat 1995, 1996). Even in 2005, 
ASEAN states still maintained various trade measures that inhibited trade 
flows among them (Lloyd 2007: 23).
Based on the 1992 CEPT-AFTA, the initial existing tariff rates were to be 
reduced to 20% within the first phase of 5 to 8 years beginning 1 January 1993, 
and to 0-5% within the second phase of 7 years. Goods with existing tariff 
rates of 20% or below automatically enjoyed the concessions and were also to 
be reduced gradually. ASEAN states also gradually eliminated quantitative 
restrictions and other non-tariff barriers within 5 years after goods enjoyed 
concessions (ASEAN Secretariat 1992).
As argued above, Neorealism does not clarify what cooperation design 
states should undertake. Waltz (1979: 79) argues that a structural theory “must 
leave aside… the characteristics of units, their behavior, and their interactions” 
and “how units relate with one another”. However, although Waltz (1979: 
118; see also Mearsheimer 2009: 241) rejects the rationality assumption, 
considering the characteristics of state interactions is definitely necessary 
to assess whether the available policy choices instrumentally promote state 
interests and represent the most optimum strategic policy (Mearsheimer 2006: 
112, 2009: 246). 
In this way, Neorealists would argue that ASEAN states’ mutual trade 
liberalization should be considered as a product of states’ instrumentally 
rational calculation. They consider regional trade liberalization as a rational 
option, while deepening protectionism or creating a communist bloc is less 
beneficial or even counterproductive. AFTA offset potential trade and FDI 
diversions caused by the establishment of the EU and NAFTA and the rise 
of China, and increased intra-ASEAN trades (Ravenhill 1995: 854; Bowles & 
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MacLean 1996: 336; Chia 1998: 218). Lower trade barriers indirectly fostered 
the ASEAN region as a production base and subsequently attracted investment 
(Ethier 1998: 1150, 1156-1159; Bowles & MacLean 1996: 332-337; Athukorala 
& Menon 1996: 87-90). AFTA was also to “enhance the competitiveness of the 
[ASEAN] region for production through tariff reduction and elimination of 
NTBs” (ASEAN Economic Into-View 1994: 10, as cited in Chirathivat 1996: 36).
However, ASEAN states’ decision to use gradual and selective liberal 
trade cooperation-design cannot be definitively considered instrumentally 
rational. According to the Neoclassical economic theory of trade, partial 
liberalization decreases distorted import prices, but does not return them to 
free trade levels. It reduces the net negative welfare effects of protection, but 
does not eliminate them. Hence, full liberalization generates more immediate 
overall benefits than partial liberalization (Krugman & Obstfeld 2003: ch.2-5; 
Suranovic 2007: ch.2-5). A partial equilibrium analytical simulation conducted 
by Imada, Montes and Naya (1991: 17-21, Table 8) showed that a 50% tariff 
reduction would have grown intra-ASEAN trade by US$538 million to 
account for a 0.99% import and a 1.48% export increase, whereas complete 
tariff elimination would have grownintra-ASEAN trade by US$1.3 billion to 
account for a 2.31% import and a 3.40% export increase. These results are 
indications that full liberalization would have generated larger overall welfare 
improvements than partial liberalization.
If national “economic growth” is really one of states’ “basic state interests” 
(Krasner 1976: 317-8), it was instrumentally irrational for ASEAN states to take 
a gradual and selective liberalization approach when forming AFTA. This 
leaves the question of why ASEAN states did not choose the Pareto optimum 
option of full trade liberalization. This irrationality is indeed inconsistent with 
Neorealism’s assumption of states as instrumentally rational actors.
Arguing that such gradual and selective liberalization reflect the strategic 
trade policy of ASEAN states also confound Neorealism. Even though infant 
industry protection and gradual liberalization may result in greater and 
long-term benefits than full liberalization. Neoclassical economists criticize 
that such interventionist policies do not work as intended. Without having 
sufficient information, governments cannot accurately predict the response 
of industries and ensure the efficacy of protections. Without calculating the 
secondary effects of protections on other industries, the actual benefits may be 
smaller or even turn out to be negative. The failure of import substitution is one 
examples of this problem. There is also no guarantee that government policies 
will continue and make the protections efficacious as previously expected. The 
protections distort resource allocation and income distribution. In short, even 
though a strategic trade policy may alter the pattern of comparative advantage 
and could improve welfare in the long term, these criticisms suggest that it 
is in fact more costly because it requires complicated calculation, effective 
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management, and may also not be efficacious (Honda et al. 1994: 27-36, 74-6; 
Krugman & Obsfeld 2003: 261-2, 281-2; Suranovic 2007: ch.11).
Such theoretical dispute creates uncertainties which perplex states’ 
instrumental calculation. It imposes a risk-uncertainty situation (Blyth 2002: 9) 
whether to (1) take an easy path by fully liberalizing trade barriers and having 
a larger probability of reaping the positive benefits of full liberalization, or 
to (2) take a difficult and risky path by developing infant industries and 
gradually and selectively liberalizing trade barriers that may, if successful, 
generate larger and long-term benefits. It can also entrap ASEAN states in 
a Knigtian-uncertainty situation, within which states are unsure of what 
the best interests to pursue are and how to then pursue undefined interests 
(Blyth 2002: 31-32). ASEAN states faced two different specific interests or 
subgoals in relation to trade liberalization: (1) overall allocative efficiency and 
comparative advantage achieved immediately though fully liberalized trade 
barriers at the risk of deindustrialization, and (2) industrialization that  could 
be realized through  gradually and selectively liberalized trade barriers at the 
cost of immediate overall allocative efficiency. Without formulating specific 
interests, the choice will be a “shot in the dark” (Blyth 2002: 36). Instrumentally 
rational calculation does not solve this problem by providing states with a 
unique optimum choice.
Neorealism under-conceptualizes its conception of national interests, 
it consequently is unclear why ASEAN states agreed to have a gradual 
and selective liberal trade cooperation. Such cooperation design cannot be 
explained only by referring to nonoperational “basic states interests” (Krasner 
1976: 317). As Gilpin (2001: 94, emphasis is original) admits, power is “a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition” for a liberal cooperation.
This consequently muddles Neorealists’ explanation of AFTA. It is not 
clear whether ASEAN states were bandwagoning with or balancing major 
economic powers. They bandwagon with global economic powers by adopting 
a liberal regime, but balance them by establishing a competitive liberal group. 
What actions of ASEAN states to deal with external threats is not clear at all 
in Neorealist perspective. The Neorealist explanation, which merely relies on 
power distribution as its independent variable, is inadequate to understand 
why ASEAN states formed AFTA and why ASEAN states chose to take a 
gradual and selective liberalization approach in AFTA. 
Bringing State-Regime Back In
The inadequacy of Neorealism does not necessarily falsify the independent 
effect of power distribution on state interaction, as power is a necessary 
condition for state action. The failure of Neorealism in explaining ASEAN 
states’ cooperation in AFTA indicates that power distribution and power 
struggle are not the only things that affect international interactions. Accepting 
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the significance of other variables in affecting state interactions does not 
necessarily mean that, as Mearsheimer (1995: 86) says, “everything matters”. 
On the other hand, doggedly arguing that power distribution is the sole 
independent variable in explaining state interaction is an over-simplification 
which lacks explanatory power for significant aspects of reality. 
State’s regimes and interests, also determine state cooperation. Both 
clarify “how” power is utilized in state interaction, what interactions are made, 
and what cooperation design is established. However, rather than being taken 
as given, state interests are defined according to “sets of implicit or explicit 
principles, norms [and] rules” (Krasner 1983: 2) which states institutionalize 
in regimes. Regimes are not treated as an intervening or residual factor (Blyth 
1997: 230), but as independently affecting state action. They set a corridor of 
actions and determine which interests and actions are normatively legitimate 
and illegitimate. Even though states have the capabilities to act illegitimately, 
states are disposed to avoid such actions due to its illegitimacy. Since power 
and interests are value dependent (Lukes 2005: 30; Rosenau 1968: 36; George 
and Keohane 1980: 217, 220, 224; Wendt 1999: 398), states’ instrumental 
rationality is always based on value-rationality (Weber 1978: 24). Based on 
their regimes, states can specify their “nonoperational” national interests.   
Nevertheless, unlike Waltz’ (1979: 79) claim, state-regime identity does 
not merely represent “the characteristics of units” irrelevant to structural 
analysis. Like state power, state-regimes are also distributed at structural 
level. While states are distributed vertically according to their powers, they 
are distributed horizontally according to their state-regime typicalities. 
Interactions between states do not only reflect power distribution, but also 
state-regimes distributions. 
International system is thus a place for struggle over regime types and 
a struggle over power. While different types of state-regimes may create 
horizontal conflicts as well as vertical conflicts, typical state-regimes may only 
create vertical conflicts. For states with the same type of state-regime, vertical 
conflicts represent their self-orientation and competition for a top position. 
Since power is “a capacity” which enable state to act (Lukes 2005: 12, 60), 
becoming the most powerful allows the state have the highest probability of 
manifesting its state-regimes internationally.    
State-regime typicalities represent the extension of state identity across 
state boundaries. States thus share not only state-regime identity, but also 
interests. These state-regime and interest typicalities are the permissive 
factors for state cooperation, and even integration. State-regime typicalities 
reduce the probability of regime struggle and consequently, since power is 
utilized to implement state-regimes, reduce the likelihood of power struggles. 
The more similar their regimes, the less likely regime and power struggles are 
in interactions between states.
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In this framework, the formation of AFTA was permissively allowed 
because of the similarity of the export-oriented industrialization regime 
which all ASEAN states started to share in the latter half of 1980s. Even 
though this export-oriented industrialization regime did not represent a 
regime supportive of free market economies and derived from strategic 
development and trade, it shifted some ASEAN states’ disposition from trade 
protection to trade liberalization. ASEAN states, particularly Indonesia and 
Philippines, unilaterally liberalized their economies, including their trade 
(Chintayarangsan, Thongpakdee, and Nakornchai 1992: 356-371). This regime 
gradually replaced the import-substitution industrialization regime adopted 
by some ASEAN states prior to 1990s and had impeded the prior establishment 
of wider and deeper liberal trade cooperation in AFTA (Pangestu, Soesastro, 
and Ahmad 1992: 335). Based on the regimes’ value-rationality, ASEAN states 
specified their nonoperational basic state interest to be economic growth 
and redefined their trade interests to match in the 1990s. This explains why 
ASEAN states generally changed their attitudes toward trade liberalization in 
the 1990s and agreed to establish AFTA in 1992. 
ASEAN states more or less shared the “principles, norms and rules” of 
market economy and trade liberalization with the EU and US, and even China. 
They did not engage in regime struggle against those states. ASEAN states were 
merely involved in a power struggle. In this way, ASEAN states’ cooperation 
in AFTA cannot simply be interpreted as balancing or bandwagoning. As 
ASEAN states are much weaker than the US, EU, and China, the formation 
of AFTA reflects ASEAN states’ defensive strategy (Ravenhill 2001: 15, Mattli 
1999: 59-64). ASEAN states could not balance those greater powers, and 
instead compensated for the potential negative effects of the EU and NAFTA 
creation and China’s rise, by enhancing the competitiveness of ASEAN 
(ASEAN Economic Into-View 1994: 10, as cited in Chirathivat 1996: 36). This 
interpretation is also consistent with some other facts, such as the inclusion 
of China in Mahathir’s EAEG proposal and China-ASEAN PTA agreement 
in 2002. This also explains why ASEAN states followed the EU and NAFTA 
by adopting a more liberal trade without necessarily joining those two big 
regional trade institutions. 
The general regime of strategic development and trade defined the 
legitimate set of actions. ASEAN states could have taken and shielded them 
from  Knightian uncertainty and risk-uncertainty. Based on their common 
regime, ASEAN states consider the full trade liberalization choice illegitimate. 
Although full trade liberalization may have instrumentally lead to overall 
welfare improvement, it would have disrupted the long-term industrial 
development and severely threatened some ASEAN states’s economies. 
Based on a general regime of strategic development and trade, ASEAN states 
preferred to take the difficult and risky path of gradual and selective trade 
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liberalization that may, if successful, generate larger long-term benefits. 
Rather than achieving overall allocative efficiency and comparative advantage 
at the risks of deindustrialization and other negative effects, ASEAN states 
preferred to gradually and selectively liberalizing trade barriers at the cost of 
overall allocative efficiency. 
Conclusion
Arguing for power as the sole independent variable for understanding the 
international system, forces Neorealism to inadequately analyze ASEAN 
states’ cooperation in AFTA and their gradual and selective liberal trade 
cooperation. The formation of AFTA does not fit as either balancing and 
bandwagoning cooperation. ASEAN states were not internally cohesive and 
had no hegemon among them. ASEAN states followed the US and EU by 
adopting a more liberal trade regimes, but competitively set their own regional 
group. They were also too dependent and too weak to cooperatively balance 
the EU and US. ASEAN states did not consistently compete with China, and 
even invited it to coopeate in building an East Asian-wide regional group. 
The cooperation did not show a clear cut of relative gain distribution. The 
deepening of AFTA proceeded through the 1990s and beyond despite the 
fact that the potential external threats failed to actualize, which Neorealism’s 
thesis of negative interested cooperation is unable to explain.
The under-conceptualization of state interests precludes Neorealism 
from explaining ASEAN states cooperation design. Arguing that states are 
interested in improving aggregate national income and sustaining economic 
growth does not adequately clarify why ASEAN states agreed to gradual and 
selective liberal trade cooperation, and not to choose the pursue the more 
beneficial full liberalization. Moreover, without a clear description of states’ 
subgoals, states appear to be trapped in risk-uncertainty and Knightian-
uncertainty situations. 
Including ASEAN states’ economic and trade regimes as variables 
not only explains why ASEAN states agreed to have a much more liberal 
cooperation in AFTA in 1990s, but also clarifies why they agreed to gradual 
and selective liberalization. The formation of a free trade area was only 
allowed by the export-oriented industrialization regimes which ASEAN 
states started to share in the latter half of 1980s. ASEAN states’ strategic 
development and trade regimes prescribed such cooperation design and 
consider full liberalization option to be an illegitimate choice. Gradual and 
selective liberalization meet the value-rationality and instrumental-rationality 
test of that strategic development and trade regime. 
Rather than doggedly arguing for power as the sole independent variable, 
understanding a causal nexus of state-regimes, interests and power provides 
a better explanation of state cooperation and cooperation design. l 
Neorealism and ASEAN States Coorporation in AFTA 221
References
Ariff, Mohamed. 1994a. ‘AFTA = Another Futile Trade Area?’, in Siddique & 
Kumar (eds), The 2nd ASEAN Reader, Singapore: Insittute of Southeast 
Asian Studies.
ASEAN Secretariat. 1992. Agreement On The Common Effective Preferential Tariff 
(CEPT) Scheme For The ASEAN Free Trade Area, Singapore, 28 January 
1992, available at <http://www.aseansec.org/ 12375.htm>, accessed 6 
July 2010.
ASEAN Secretariat. 1995. Protocol To Amend The Agreement On The Common 
Effective Preferential Tariff Scheme For The ASEAN Free Trade Area, an 
agreement made in Bangkok on 15th December 2000, avaialble at 
<http://www.aseansec.org/5174.htm>, accessed 6 July 2010.
ASEAN Secretariat. 1996. ‘New Time Frame’, AFTA Reader Vol. 4 (September), 
avaialble at <http://www.aseansec.org/10101.htm>, accessed 7 July 
2010.
ASEAN Secretariat. 2000. Protocol Regarding the Implementation of the CEPT 
Scheme Temporary Exclusion List, an Agreement Made During the 4th 
ASEAN Informal Summit in Singapore on 23rd  November 2000, avaialble 
at <http://www.aseansec.org/5306.htm>, accessed 8 July 2010.
Athukorala, Prema-Chandra and  Jayant Menon. 1996. ‘Foreign Direct 
Investment in ASEAN: Can AFTA Make a Difference?’ in AFTA in the 
Changing International Economy, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian 
Studies.
Blyth, Mark M. 1997. ‘Review: Any More Bright Ideas?: the Ideational Turn of 
Comparative Political Economy’, Comparative Politics 29(2).
Blyth, Mark M. 2002. Great Transformations: Economic Ideas and Institutional 
Change in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.
Bowles, Paul & Brian MacLean.1996. ‘Understanding Trade Bloc Formation: 
the Case of the ASEAN Free Trade Area’, Review of International Political 
Economy 3(2).
Buszynski, Leszek. 1997/98. ‘ASEAN’s New Challenges’, Pacific Affairs 70(4).
Chia, Siow Yue. 1998. ‘The ASEAN Free Trade Area’, Pacific Affairs 11(2).
Chia, Siow Yue. 2006. ‘ASEAN-China Economic Competition and Free Trade 
Area’, Asian Economic Papers 4(1).
Chia, Siow Yue and Chalongphob Sussangkarn. 2006. ‘The Economic Rise 
of China: Challenges and Opportunities for ASEAN’, Asian Economic 
Policy Review 1(1).
Chirathivat, Suthiphand. 1996. ‘ASEAN Economic Integration With the 
World through AFTA’, in AFTA in the Changing International Economy, 
Singapore: Insitute of Southeast Asian Studies.
Chintayarangsan, Rachain, Nattapong Thongpakdee, and Pruttiphon 
Ganjar Nugroho222
Nakornchai. 1992. ‘ASEAN Economies: Macro-economic Perspective’, 
ASEAN Economic Bulletin 8(3).
Damuri, Yose R., Raymond Atje and Arya B. Gaduh. 2006. Integration and trade 
Specialization in East Asia, CSIS Working Paper Series, WPE094 (March), 
Jakarta: Centre for Strategic and International Studies.
De Simone, Fransisco de A. Nadal. 1996. ‘Regional integration arrangements: 
AFTA from a Comparative Perspective’, AFTA in the Changing 
International Economy, Singapore: ISEAS.
Ethier, Wilfred J. 1998. ‘The New Regionalism’, The Economic Journal 
108(449).
Frost, Frank. 1990. ‘Introduction: ASEAN Since 1967 -- Origins, Evolution 
and Recent Development’, in A. Broinowski (ed) ASEAN into the 1990s, 
Basingstoke and London: The Macmillan Press, Ltd.
Hurrell, Andrew. 1995. ‘Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective’, in L. Fawcett 
and A. Hurrell (eds) Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization 
and International Order, New York: Oxford University Press.
George, Alexander and Robert O. Keohane. 1980. ‘The Concept of National 
Interest: Uses and Limitations’, in Alexander George (ed) Presidential 
Decisionmaking in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and 
Advice, Boulder: Westview.
Gilpin, Robert. 2001. Global Political Economy: Understanding the International 
Economic Order, Princeton & Ofxord: Princeton University Press.
Grieco, Joseph M. 1988. ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: a Realist 
Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism’, International 
Organization, 42(3).
Honda, Tetsushi, Hideshi Ueda, Yasushi Nakahashi, and Kazuyuki Tagawa. 
1994. Theory of Strategic Trade Policies, Tokyo: Research Institute of 
International Trade and Industry.
Imada, Pearl, Manuel Montes & Seiji Naya. 1991. A Free Trade Area: Implications 
for ASEAN, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
International Monetary Fund (IMF). 2009. Directions of Trades (DOTs), various 
years.
Krasner, Stephen D. 1976. ‘State Power and the Structure of International 
Trade’, World Politics, 28(2).
Krasner, Stephen D. 1983 ‘Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: 
Regimes as Intervening Variables’, in S.D. Krasner (ed) International 
regimes, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
Kratochwil, Friedrich. 1982. ‘On the Notion of ‘Interest’ in International 
Relations’, International Organization 36(1) Winter.
Krugman, Paul & Maurice Obstfeld. 2003. International Economics: Theory and 
Policy, 6th edition, Boston, San Fransisco, New York: Addisson-Wesley, 
World Student Series.
Neorealism and ASEAN States Coorporation in AFTA 223
Lloyd, Peter J. 2007. ‘What is a Single Market? An application to the Case of 
ASEAN’, in Denis Hew (ed) Brick by brick: The Building of an ASEAN 
Economic Community, Singapore: ISEAS.
Lukes, Steven. 2005. Power: A Radical View. Second Edition. Hampshire: 
Palgrave Macmillan.
Mohamad, Mahathir. 1992. A Speech Delivered at The Foreign Correspondents, 
Hong Kong, 14 October 1992, available at <http://www.pmo.gov.
my/WebNotesApp/PastPM.nsf/a310590c7cafaaae48256db4001773ea/
83f9db08a883909f4825674a001882df?OpenDocument>, accessed 28 
September 2007.
Mohamad, Mahathir. .1993. A Speech Delivered at The Asia Society 
Conference on ‘Asia and the Changing World Order’, Tokyo, 13 May 
1993, available at <http://www.pmo.gov.my/WebNotesApp/PastPM.
nsf/a310590c7cafaaae48256db4001773ea/36aca36ece 853c2a4825674a00
1a14cf?OpenDocument>, accessed 28 September 2007.
Mearsheimer, John J. 1994/95. ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, 
International Security 19(3).
Mearsheimer, John J. 1995. ‘Realist reply’, International Security 20(1): 82-93.
Mearsheimer, John J. 2006. ‘Conversations in International Relations: interview 
with John J. Mearsheimer (Part I)’, International Relations 20(1).
Mearsheimer, John J. 2009. ‘Reckless States and Realism’, International Relations 
23(2).
Morgenthau, Hans J. 1954 [1948]. Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power 
and Peace, New York: Knopf.
Nesadurai, Helen E.S. 2003. Globalization, Domestic Politics and Regionalism: The 
ASEAN Free Trade Area, London & New York: Routledge.
Pangestu, Mari, Hadi Soesastro, and Mubarig Ahmad. 1992. ‘A new look at 
intra-ASEAN Economic Co-operation, ASEAN Economic Bulletin 8(3).
Park, Innwon. 1995. Regional Integration among the ASEAN Nations: A Computable 
General Equilibrium Model Study, Westport: Praeger Publisher.
Ravenhill, John. 1995. ‘Economic Cooperation in Southeast Asia: Changing 
Incentives’, Asian Survey 35(9).
Ravenhill, John. 2003. ‘The new bilateralism in the Asia Pacific’, Third World 
Quarterly 24(2).
Ravenhill, John. 2008. ‘The Move to Preferential Trade on the Western Pacific 
Rim: Some Initial Conclusions’, Australian Journal of International Affairs 
62(2).
Rosenau, James N. 1968 ‘National interest’, in William A. Darity (ed) 
International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, Vol.11, 1st ed., Detroit: 
Macmillan Reference USA.
Solís, Mireya and Saori N. Katada. 2009. ‘Explaining FTA Ploriferation: a Policy 
Diffusion Framework’, in  M. Solís, B. Stallings and S.N. Katada (eds) 
Ganjar Nugroho224
Competitive Regionalism: FTA Diffusion in the Pacific Rim, Basingstoke and 
New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Suranovic, Steven M. 2007 International Trade Theory and Policy Analysis, 
available at <http://internationalecon.com/Trade/tradehome.php>, 
accessed 20 October 2009.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 2007. 
‘Inward FDI Flows by Host Region and Economy (1970-2005)’, World 
Investment Report 2006, October 16, 2006, available at <http://www.
unctad.org>, accessed 10 January 2007.
Voon, Jan P. and Ren Yue. 2003. ‘China-ASEAN Export Rivalry in the US 
market: the Importance of the HK-China Production Synergy and the 
Asian Financial Crisis’, Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy 8(2).
Walt, Stephen M. 2005. “Alliances: Balancing and Bandwagoning,” in Robert 
J. Art and Robert Jervis (eds). International Politics: Enduring Concepts and 
Contemporary Issues, New York: Pearson/Longman.
Waltz, Kenneth. 1959. Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis, New 
York: Columbia University Press.
Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics, Reading, Mass.: Addison-
Wesley.
Weber, Max. 1978. Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, 
Vol. 1, Berkeley amd Los Angeles: University of California Press.
World Bank. 2010. World dataBank: World Development Indicators (WDI) & 
Global Development Finance (GDF) Online, available at <http://databank.
worldbank.org/ddp/home.do>, accessed 12 December 2010.
World Trade Organization (WTO). 1947. General Agreement for Tariffs and 
Trade 1947, available at <http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_
e/legal_e.htm>, accessed 2 September 2008.
